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


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# Routine Activities and Right-Wing Extremists: An Empirical Comparison of the Victims of Ideologically- and Non-Ideologically-Motivated Homicides Committed by American Far-Rightists

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# Routine Activities and Right-Wing Extremists: An Empirical Comparison of the Victims of Ideologically- and Non-Ideologically-Motivated Homicides Committed by American Far-Rightists

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*This study examines whether Criminology's Routine Activities Theory (RAT) and related Lifestyle Theory (LST) can account for variation between the attributes of victims of fatal ideologically motivated attacks (akin to terrorism) and the victims of non-ideologically motivated homicide incidents committed by far-Right extremists in the United States. This article makes four contributions. First, we empirically test Criminology theory in the context of terrorism by using routine activities to devise four core hypotheses to explain differences between the two types of victims. Second, our investigation uniquely includes a non-terrorist comparison group (i.e., victims of homicides committed by extremists for personal reasons like greed). Third, our study focuses on ideological victimization. Terrorism researchers have usually ignored victims because of the difficulty in accessing the necessary data. Finally, we also make a methodological contribution by showing that criminology can build upon the terrorism literature by utilizing open-sources. Using data from the Extremist Crime Database (ECDB), the results of a multivariate analysis partially supported the hypotheses, showing that RAT and LST offer empirically supported theoretical constructs that have the ability to differentiate between ideological and non-ideological homicides.*

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**Keywords** far-Right extremism, homicide victimization, Lifestyle Theory (LST), open-source data, Routine Activities Theory (RAT)

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## Introduction

This study examines whether Criminology's Routine Activities Theory (RAT) and related Lifestyle Theory (LST) can account for variation between the attributes of victims of fatal ideologically motivated attacks (akin to terrorism) and the victims of non-ideologically motivated homicide incidents committed by far-Right extremists in the United States. This paper makes four contributions.

First, we empirically test criminological theory in the context of terrorism. We use the theoretical underpinnings of RAT and LST to devise four core hypotheses to explain differences between the two types of victims outlined above. This builds on the extant literature as criminological theory has rarely been tested in a terrorism context. This is an oversight as terrorism, by definition, involves [violent] criminal behavior.[1] Our literature review located only a handful of studies that used Criminology theories to explain individual-level victimization related to terrorism.[2]

Second, our empirical investigation includes a non-terrorist comparison group. We use data from the open-source United States Extremist Crime Database (ECDB). The ECDB includes violent and financial crimes committed by far-Right extremists. It includes information on the victims of both *ideologically motivated* (i.e., homicides committed by far-Rightists to further their ideology such as attacks against the government, minorities, or abortion providers) and *non-ideologically motivated homicides* (not committed for ideological reasons but instead perpetrated for greed or other reasons like a domestic violence homicide) committed by these extremists.[3]

Our use of this comparison group of non-ideologically motivated homicide (i.e., homicides committed for personal reasons) victims is unique. It is important to reiterate though, that the victims in this comparison group were still killed by an extremist, i.e., a far-Rightist. Although the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Supplementary Homicide Report (SHR) that is often used in homicide research includes "regular" homicides (i.e., killings committed for non-ideologically motivated reasons by non-extremists), we decided against using the SHR to create a comparison group for this study. The SHR is limited in the number of variables collected and therefore the data would drive how the theory was operationalized. To more accurately test RAT and LST, the ECDB was used as open-sources could be mined to supplement the original dataset to capture a larger number of variables than those available in the SHR. In addition, even if the SHR were utilized as a sampling frame to identify an appropriate comparison group, which could then be further searched in open-sources, homicides missing from the SHR, as well as the exclusion of certain types of homicides by the media, would introduce unknown bias into the analysis.

We also decided against using the FBI's National Incident Based Recording System (NIBRS) that tracks homicides and includes a much larger number of attributes than the SHR. Unfortunately, NIBRS suffers from reporting problems that would also introduce unknown bias into the analysis if we used it to supply a comparison group. Our use of the non-ideologically motivated homicides from the ECDB, in short, moves terrorism research forward. But, other questions remain and we hope that future research builds upon it to also examine how a sample of

regular homicide victims, killed by non-extremists for personal reasons, compare to the two categories studied here.

Previous studies testing RAT and LST on the individual level have not used comparison groups of victims of non-terrorist (or ideologically motivated) attacks. Hamm applied social learning and RAT to terrorism case studies.[4] Canetti-Nisim, Mesch, and Pedahzur used RAT to explain variation across the victims of different types of terrorist attacks.[5] In their study of victims of terrorism, Feniger and Yuchtman-Yaar compared Israelis killed during terrorist attacks to victims of terrorist violence in Northern Ireland.[6] They also compared characteristics of these victims to macro-level characteristics of the populations of Israel and Northern Ireland. Parkin, Freilich, and Chermak compared victims of ideologically motivated far-Right homicide incidents to prior research on homicide victims.[7]

Again, this study treats the victims of the non-ideologically motivated homicides committed by far-Rightists as a comparison group. We argue that RAT and LST explain both ideologically motivated (akin to terrorism) and non-ideologically motivated (non-terrorism) homicide victimizations committed by far-Right extremists in the United States. It is hypothesized, however, that the two groups' routine activities differ, thus varying their exposure to dangerous places and people.

Third, our study focuses on ideological *victimization*. Terrorism researchers have usually ignored victims because of the difficulty in accessing the necessary data. Scholars have assumed that terrorist victims are randomly selected and that there are no patterns to explain. Although ideological victimization has been shown not to be random, at least in the purest sense,[8] most terrorism studies examine terrorist incidents, perpetrators, or organizations.[9] In contrast, criminology has developed a sub-field focused solely on the victims of crime. We thus use the open-source ECDB because, unlike other terrorism databases, it includes victim attributes. Our findings demonstrate that the victims of ideologically motivated victimization exhibit patterns and are not randomly selected. We hope that this study begins to accomplish what Lauritsen described as integrating "knowledge across the various forms of victimization . . . [to produce] . . . theoretical work [that] has the capacity to enrich multiple fields of study."[10]

Finally, we also make a methodological contribution. This study's data, like the majority of quantitative terrorism studies, come from open-sources. Conversely, criminological victimization studies typically rely upon official data (police or coroner data) or victimization surveys for non-homicide cases.[11] Perhaps criminology could build upon the terrorism literature to tap open-sources as another resource that could be used to triangulate data.

In sum, this study makes contributions to the terrorism and criminological literatures. The findings should be of interest to academics, analysts, and practitioners. Below, we first review the micro-level homicide victimization RAT and LST literatures to devise four core hypotheses to explain the variation between the victims of ideologically motivated fatal strikes, and the victims of non-ideologically motivated homicide incidents. We then discuss the data and research design used to investigate these claims before presenting the results. The paper concludes by discussing the implications of the findings and areas for additional research.

## Literature Review and Research Hypotheses

RAT and LST are designed to explain which individuals are more likely to be victimized. These theories, in other words, explain differences between crime victims

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and non-victims.[12] The central argument states that individuals are more likely to be victimized if they encounter a motivated offender during an event where there are no guardians present who could prevent the victimization. Since peoples' routine activities (e.g., work and leisure patterns) differ, individuals vary in the likelihood that they will encounter situations where motivated offenders are present and guardians are not.[13]

Originally, the RAT framework was used to explain macro-level variation in crime rates, but subsequently it was employed to account for individual-level behavior, both victimization and offending.[14] LST similarly maintains that "because criminal victimization is not randomly distributed across time and space and because offenders are not representative of the general population, this implies that lifestyle [i.e., how people spend their time in terms of work and leisure] differences are associated with differences in exposure to situations that have a high victimization risk."[15]

Importantly though, RAT and LST have also been used to explain variation between different types of victims. For example, studies have compared homicides involving intimate partners to non-intimate partner homicides, females killing husbands to males killing wives, interracial to intra-racial homicides, homicides involving elderly victims to non-elderly homicides, and homicides that occur at a workplace to non-workplace homicides.[16] We extend this approach and compare the victims of fatal ideologically motivated homicides (akin to terrorist acts) to the victims of fatal non-ideologically motivated attacks, both of which are committed by far-Rightists.

One major theme of RAT is that individuals involved in a "risky" lifestyle such as drinking to excess, doing drugs, or staying out late are more likely to be victimized. In such situations, there is a higher likelihood that a motivated offender is present under dangerous circumstances (fewer guardians around) and this increases the risk of victimization.[17] Another aspect of a risky lifestyle is engaging in criminal behavior.[18] Certain acts like drinking alcohol to excess, or getting high, make individuals more vulnerable to victimization (e.g., less alert). Offenders commonly commit crime with, or associate with, other criminals. Offenders thus spend more time with other motivated offenders who could easily target them. Further, since offenders seek to avoid law enforcement scrutiny, they are less likely to report their own victimizations. These factors increase the attractiveness of offenders as a target for other offenders to victimize.[19] Not surprisingly then, victim and offender characteristics have been found to overlap (especially with homicide), and many crime victims have offended in the past.[20]

Based upon this, we expect non-ideologically motivated homicide victims to be more likely to have a prior arrest. These victims should mirror the regular homicide victims just discussed. On the other hand, we might assume that ideologically motivated homicide victims will be less likely to have a prior arrest. Far-Rightists often target government officials, such as the police, or abortion providers (such as physicians who perform abortions). Such persons, we suspect, are less likely to have committed a crime in the past.[21]

Consistent with the victim and offender overlap thesis just discussed, ethnographers[22] have documented that many in the far-Right movement engage in different kinds of deviant behavior, and are attracted to violence.[23] In this sense, becoming part of the far-Right movement places individuals in the company of more potential offenders. Further, ideologically motivated homicide victims by definition will come

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from groups that far-Rightists consider enemies such as government/police officers, racial and religious minority members, and abortion providers. None of these individuals are likely to be far-Right extremists. Thus, the victims of non-ideologically motivated homicides will be more likely than the victims of ideologically motivated homicides to also be members of the far-Right movement.

Based on prior research, we also predict that ideologically motivated and non-ideologically motivated homicide victims differ in terms of their demographics, for example marital status and age. Non-ideologically motivated victims should again be similar to the victims of regular homicides. Theorists argue that both non-married and younger individuals are more likely to engage in routine activities (going out at night, staying out late, and engaging in risky behaviors like drinking and related actions) that place them in dangerous places with dangerous persons.[24] On the other hand, ideologically motivated homicide victims should be more likely to include police officers and other government officials and abortion providers who are more likely to be both married and older. We expect non-ideologically motivated homicide victims are less likely than ideologically motivated victims to be married and are more likely to be younger.

Based upon these offender victim overlap and proximity arguments, we also expect non-ideologically motivated far-Right homicide victims to look like their far-Right perpetrators, who are overwhelmingly White.[25] On the other hand, while some ideologically motivated far-Right homicide victims such as police officers or abortion providers are perhaps more likely to be White, the most common far-Right homicide attack is directed against racial and ethnic minority group members.[26] We predict that non-ideologically motivated homicide victims are more likely than ideologically motivated victims to be White.

Related to victim sex, RAT and LST argue that males are more likely than females to be victimized because they more often engage in risky behaviors outside the home that put them in contact with potential offenders.[27] This suggests that non-ideologically motivated homicide victims, who we have argued usually mirror the homicide victims in general, will more often be men. But, there are aspects of the far-Right movement that lead us to question this possibility. Far-Rightist ideologically motivated attacks often target police officers, gays, and homeless individuals, many of whom are males.[28] On the other hand, as noted, the far-Right movement attracts and often specifically seeks to recruit violent males. Further, far-Rightist ideology is consistent with traditional/patriarchal views that expect women to be submissive, and thus may be accepting of domestic violence attacks by their adherents.[29] We expect that the overwhelming majority of the victims of these non-ideologically motivated domestic violence homicides committed by far-Rightists will be women. Therefore, we hypothesize that non-ideologically motivated homicide victims are more likely than ideologically motivated victims to be female.

Meanwhile, victims of non-ideologically motivated homicides, for the reasons previously discussed, should know their perpetrators. Indeed, Messner and Tardiff's classic study found that over 65% of homicide incidents involved offenders and victims who knew each other.[30] Further, the non-ideologically motivated victims, some of whom are also far-Rightists, may know their perpetrators because they were part of the far-Right movement together. Victims of ideologically motivated homicides, on the other hand, invariably are part of groups such as police officers, members of the LGBTQ community, minority members, and abortion providers whom the far-Right views as enemies. Most of these victims are selected for symbolic

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purposes because of what they represent and not because they personally knew the offender.[31] This too is consistent with the RAT approach, which maintains that "a central assumption . . . is that particular targets are selected because they have symbolic or economic value to the offender."[32] We predict that the non-ideologically motivated victims and perpetrators are more likely to know one another compared to ideologically motivated victims and perpetrators.

RAT and LST have also highlighted the importance of situational factors in understanding the likelihood of victimization.[33] Scholars have noted that homicide events are transactional processes and that the actions of the victim are important.[34] It has been found that actions committed by the victim that the perpetrator views as threatening, usually referred to as victim provocation, make victimization more likely.[35] Once again, non-ideologically motivated homicide victims should mirror the findings regarding regular homicide victims. On the other hand, far-Right ideologically motivated homicide incidents might occur because the perpetrators sought out their enemies (i.e., police officers, homeless individuals, gays, lesbians, abortion providers, and racial and religious minorities) to attack. We hypothesize that non-ideologically motivated homicide victims will be more likely than ideologically motivated victims to have engaged in provocation.

Another important situational factor according to RAT and LST is the location of the homicide victimization. As our discussion above alluded to, some places are more dangerous and attract more deviant individuals and have fewer guardians present. These locations include bars (where drinking occurs and the clientele are disproportionately young, unmarried men), motels/hotels (where people are transient), and prisons (which by definition are inhabited overwhelmingly with offenders). Such places, in other words, are more likely to be inhabited by more motivated offenders and victimization is more likely.[36] On the other hand, other locations such as work, or school, are seen as providing more guardians and as less likely to attract deviant others, which in turn makes victimization less likely.[37] Once again we expect the non-ideologically motivated homicide victims to mirror the homicide victims and therefore be more likely to be victimized in riskier environments like bars, motels, and prisons. On the other hand, victims of ideologically motivated homicide incidents that include abortion providers and police officers should be more likely to be at work when victimized.[38]

Relatedly, RAT and LST maintain that inside locations are usually safer than outside places.[39] Meier and Miethe explain that individuals are at a greater risk for victimization if "they are more often in public places."[40] But, we question whether the victims of ideologically motivated homicide attacks will be more likely to be attacked outside. Far-Right perpetrators, we suspect, may encounter police officers as they engage in their work routines that often place them outside. Similarly, it seems likely that far-Rightists will have more opportunities to attack minorities while they are outside as opposed to inside. Conversely, and perhaps surprisingly, we contend that while some non-ideologically motivated homicide victims will also be attacked outside (due to greater opportunities), others could be victimized inside such as domestic violence victims or the victims of drug deals gone bad. Thus, non-ideologically motivated homicide victims will be less likely to be attacked outside compared to the victims of ideologically motivated homicides.

Another RAT and LST argument is that many non-ideologically motivated homicide victims are killed when potential guardians are not present. Similarly, non-ideologically motivated homicide incidents should be less likely to have multiple

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victims since more victims means that there were more potential guardians present. This situation provides less of an opportunity for an attack since it is more difficult to perpetrate. Ideologically motivated homicide victims, however, are more likely to have been killed while others are around. Police officers and abortion providers who were killed for ideological reasons were likely working and their jobs should have put them in close proximity with others.

We would also expect the ideologically motivated homicide incidents to be more likely to have multiple victims. The reason is that far-Right perpetrators are interested in furthering their ideology and are less focused on the greater risk to them posed by increased guardianship.

Finally, RAT and LST point to the day of the week that the victim was attacked as another important situational factor. LST and RAT contend that regular homicide incidents (like the non-ideologically motivated homicides examined here) are more likely to occur in risky places like bars. An extension of this argument, then, is that these victimizations will occur during the weekend (i.e., Friday, Saturday, and Sunday) when individuals are more likely to engage in risky lifestyles.[41] Ideologically motivated homicide victims should be just as likely to be attacked on a weekday as a weekend because the victimization is less a function of a risky lifestyle and more a result of their specific ideology. Again, abortion providers and police officers targeted while on the job would be as likely to be working on a weekday as during the weekend.

Based on this review of prior literature, we developed four core hypotheses that aggregate individual and situational level characteristics into broad constructs predicted by RAT and LST to have a relationship with victimization. We hypothesize that these characteristics should significantly predict differences across ideological and non-ideologically motivated homicide victimizations committed by far-Rightists. Table 1 lists each hypothesis, the corresponding measures, and the predicted direction for each relationship.

## Data and Methods

### *Unit of Analysis*

This study's unit of analysis is the victim. We use data from the United States Extremist Crime Database (ECDB), a relational database that includes information on violent and financial crimes committed by political extremists in the United States.[42] The population studied here includes anyone killed between 1990 and 2007 in the United States during a homicide incident perpetrated by at least one far-Right extremist.[43] This population encompasses two sub-groups: a) victims of *ideologically motivated* homicide incidents, and the b) victims of *non-ideologically motivated* homicide incidents, committed by at least one Right-wing extremist.

For a homicide to be included in this study it must satisfy a two-pronged test. The first prong is behavioral and requires that the homicide was committed inside the United States. The second prong is attitudinal, and requires that, at the time of the homicide incident, at least one of the perpetrators must have subscribed to an extremist, far-Right belief system.[44]

The ECDB's process for identifying and collecting extremist crime data from open-sources has been adequately detailed elsewhere.[45] It has proved to be a valid source of data on fatal ideologically motivated attacks committed by far-Rightists

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**Table 1.** Research hypotheses and corresponding measures

| Hypothesis | Measure | When compared to non-ideological victims, ideological victims are... |
|---|---|---|
| $H_1$ Victims of non-ideologically motivated homicide incidents are more likely than victims of ideologically motivated homicides to share similar criminal histories and ideological backgrounds with their offenders. | Criminal history | ...less likely to have a criminal history. |
| | Ideological extremist | ...less likely to be an ideological extremist. |
| $H_2$ Victims of non-ideologically motivated homicide incidents are more likely than victims of ideologically motivated homicides to share demographic characteristics with, and even know, their offenders, as these will increase the likelihood of similar lifestyles, which in turn will increase the likelihood of victim exposure to motivated offenders and homicide risk. | Married | ...more likely to be married. |
| | Age 15–24 | ...less likely to be within their prime offending years. |
| | Minority | ...more likely to be minorities. |
| | Male | ...more likely to be female. |
| | Victim–offender strangers | ...more likely to have no prior relationship with the offender. |
| $H_3$ Victims of non-ideological homicide incidents are more likely than the victims of ideologically motivated homicides to have engaged in "victim provocation" | Victim precipitation | ...less likely to engage in acts that precipitate their own victimization. |
| $H_4$ Victims of non-ideological homicide incidents are more likely to be victimized than victims of ideological homicide incidents during routine activities that decrease guardianship and increase exposure to motivated offenders. | Risky location | ...less likely to be killed in a risky location. |
| | Victimized at home | ...less likely to be victimized at home. |
| | Victimized at work | ...more likely to be victimized at work. |
| | Victimized outside | ...more likely to be victimized outside. |
| | Others around | ...more likely to be victimized with others around. |
| | Multiple victims | ...more likely to be victimized with someone else. |
| | Weekend | ...less likely to be killed on a weekend. |

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in the United States.[46] Recent studies have relied on the ECDB to study extremist groups,[47] homicide events,[48] fatal strikes against the police,[49] lone wolf attacks,[50] and county-level variation where extremist perpetrators resided at the time they attacked.[51]

The ECDB uses multiple open-source documents, such as newspaper articles, court documents, and Internet websites to collect information on each crime. Incidents were identified in official (e.g., FBI, Department of Justice) sources, academic chronologies, watch groups, news archives, and Internet search engines.[52] In addition to the multiple searches of open-source materials conducted prior to and during the coding of these incidents, further data collection efforts were utilized to fill in missing values for this and a related study.[53]

These additional steps included coding several new variables and searching specialized open-source databases such as Ancestry.com and BeenVerified.com. Ancestry.com was used to supplement the open-source materials for the variables on marital status, military history, race, and age. BeenVerified.com was used to search for information on a victim's criminal histories, race, and age. In addition to these specialized databases, targeted follow-up searches were conducted to fill in missing values and confirm existing values.

Many of the variables for this study measure evidence of each attribute as reported in open-source materials. For example, whether a victim's criminal history is coded "Yes" depends on whether the open-source materials state that the individual was arrested in the past. This coding methodology means that the default response for all victims is no criminal history, unless evidence appears in the open-sources that contradict this response. This is necessary when working with open-source materials. We would not expect a negative response to be reported, especially in a journalistic source. A newspaper article has no reason to report that the victim had no criminal record and is more likely to report if the victim did have a criminal history. Thus, the frequency of the affirmative responses should be viewed as the minimal number of individuals where that characteristic is present (i.e., it should be viewed as a "floor" and not a "ceiling"). Due to the use of multiple open-sources, as well as the utilization of the aforementioned methodology for coding affirmative responses, we were able to include all homicide victims.

Missing data have the potential to undermine a study's validity. However, the two groups studied here, the victims of ideologically motivated victims and non-ideologically motivated homicides committed by far-Rightists, were identified through the same method. The variables were coded and searched using the same open-source materials. There is no reason to believe that the likelihood of missing data varies between these two groups of victims. An effort was made to code the variables so that the affirmation of the characteristic was theoretically relevant and cases lacking information would include negative responses, underestimating the impact of theoretically important characteristics. Again, the model for this research is based on variables that either directly or indirectly measure concepts posited through theories of victimization. Table 2 lists each variable and their possible outcomes.

### *Dependent Variable*

The dependent variable, *Victimization Type*, is dichotomous and includes individuals killed by far-Right extremists during ideologically motivated homicides and

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**Table 2.** Dependent and independent variables

| Variables | | Responses |
|---|---|---|
| Dependent | Victimization type | Ideological; non-ideological |
| $H_1$ | Criminal history | Yes; No |
| | Ideological extremist | Yes; No |
| $H_2$ | Married | Yes; No |
| | Age 15–24 | Yes; No |
| | Minority | Yes; No |
| | Male | Yes; No |
| | Victim–offender strangers | Yes; No |
| $H_3$ | Victim precipitation | Yes; No |
| $H_4$ | Risky location | Yes; No |
| | Victimized at home | Yes; No |
| | Victimized at work | Yes; No |
| | Victimized outside | Yes; No |
| | Others around | Yes; No |
| | Multiple victims | Yes; No |
| | Weekend | Yes; No |
| Control | Season | Winter; Spring; Summer; Fall |
| | Region | Northeast; Midwest; South; West |
| | Years | 1990–1994; 1995–1999; 2000–2004; 2005–2007 |
| | Offender White Supremacist | Yes; No |

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individuals killed by far-Right extremists during non-ideologically motivated homicides. The victims of ideologically motivated homicides represent victims of terrorist or extremist violence in the United States, while the victims of non-ideologically motivated homicides are typical of ordinary homicides, including individuals killed during robberies or domestic disputes. Again, for a homicide victim to be part of the ideologically motivated group, evidence must exist that the offender committed the homicide to further their extremist far-Right ideology. Evidence of this nature could include an offender espousing that the targeting of a minority victim was to provoke a race war between Whites and minorities or that the assassination of a police officer was to further their anti-government stance.[54] Homicide victims were coded as part of the non-ideologically motivated group when the open-sources did not provide evidence that the offender committed the act to further their ideology. Instead, the evidence suggested that the homicide was committed for personal reasons. The overwhelming majority of the non-ideologically motivated homicides were committed during robberies, burglaries, or drug deals, and others were domestic violence-related or were associated with personal disputes between friends or colleagues.

### *Independent Variables*

The independent variables are grouped by their corresponding hypotheses or whether they were control variables. The variables used to operationalize $H_1$ (see

Table 2) include *Criminal History* and *Ideological Extremist*. Our criminal history attribute measures the victim–offender overlap. In addition to utilizing the data from the ECDB, the criminal history variable was augmented using Beenverified.com. This engine searches county and state court records that are accessible electronically and available to the public. If evidence of a non-traffic related arrest was found in any of the open-source materials, the victim was coded as "yes" for criminal history. In addition to criminal history, evidence of victim ideological extremism was also used to capture victim–offender overlap. We coded as far-Right extremists, victims who either belonged to a far-Right extremist organization, such as the Aryan Nations, or anti-government militias as well as unaffiliated individuals who adhered to an extremist far-Right ideology.

The second set of variables ($H_2$ in Table 2) focus on demographic characteristics and were operationalized based on whether the victim had ever been married, was a racial or ethnic minority, was killed during their prime offending years, was male, and if they knew their offender. These variables focus on similarities between victims and offenders based on demographics that should influence their lifestyles. Marital status was coded using original ECDB data and augmented with marriage and divorce records available through Ancestry.com. Victims were coded as "yes" for ever married if evidence existed that they were married, divorced, or widowed. For racial and ethnic minorities, all individuals were coded as "yes" if they were of a minority race or ethnicity.[55] Individuals were coded as "no" or White non-Hispanic unless information in the open-source materials identified them as otherwise. For age, victims were coded as "yes" if they were between the ages of 15 to 24, years in which individuals often engage in lifestyles that are riskier than those in other age groups. Sex was coded as a dichotomous variable with "yes" representing victims who were male. Finally, homicide victims were coded as a "yes" if they had a prior relationship with at least one of the offenders, whether they were acquaintances, family members, or romantically involved.

The sole focus of $H_3$ is related to victim precipitation. Although victimization research looks at both active and passive victim precipitation, this study focuses solely on active precipitation. If there was evidence that a victim's physical actions could be perceived as an aggressive act by the offender, who then reacted with a fatal level of violence, victim precipitation was coded as a "yes."

We operationalized $H_4$, using variables related to decreased guardianship and increased exposure. Location and why a victim was at that location are important constructs to include in a victimization model. Time spent in risky places, such as bars, motels/hotels, or prisons should increase exposure to offenders. Victimization risk was also operationalized based on a mixture of the victim's location and activity. For example, data were coded based on whether victims were killed in their homes or while at work or engaging in work-related activity, such as police officers serving warrants or cashiers at convenience stores.[56] The final location-related variable was whether the individual was killed inside or outside. An outside location was coded as "yes" if victims were killed outside of a stationary structure.

Other situational characteristics related to $H_4$ included whether others were around at the time of the homicide, whether there were multiple victims, and temporal information about the incidents. For the variable *Others Around*, a victim was coded as "yes" if there was evidence that someone, other than the offenders and victims, was around at the time of victimization. *Multiple Victims* was coded "yes" if there was more than one person killed or injured. Finally, the data captured

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whether the victimization occurred on a weekend, measured as a Friday, Saturday, or Sunday.

### *Control Variables*

Information on several control variables was also included in the model. RAT and LST discuss seasonal factors. Some claim that warmer weather leads people to be outside more and to socialize more. This could encourage more risky behaviors that increase contact between motivated offenders and victims. Research on this possibility has produced mixed results.[57] *Season* was coded as "Winter" (December through February), "Spring" (March through May), "Summer" (June through August), and "Fall" (September through November), with "Fall" coded as the reference category. Region was coded as the "Northeast," "South," "Midwest," or "West," with "South" coded as the reference category.

Year of victimization was aggregated into "1990–1994," "1995–1999," "2000–2004", or "2005–2007," with "2005–2007" coded as the reference category. Breaking the data into these periods allows us to control for several high-impact events that could potentially influence far-Right behavior. First, the Oklahoma City bombing occurred in 1995 after a period of increased far-Right activity due to the actions of federal law enforcement at Ruby Ridge, Idaho and Waco, Texas. Also, the ushering in of the new millennium was symbolic to the far-Right for reasons related both to apocalyptical religious beliefs as well as a fear that technology would fail *en masse* because of programming errors in computer software.[58] Finally, if offenders who killed victims belonged to the White Supremacy wing of the far-Right movement (e.g., Neo-Nazis, Skinheads, members of the Aryan Brotherhood) they were coded as "yes." Those in the "no" category represent a diverse group of far-Rightists such as those who are anti-government, survivalists, members of the Christian Identity religious movement, and anti-abortionists. We also include control variables for whether any victims were killed by White Supremacists and for differences in victimization patterns within the far-Right movement.

Descriptive information for each variable was calculated across victimization groups; bivariate analyses were conducted to examine the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. These analyses included conducting crosstabulations and chi-square significance tests. Finally, a multivariate binary logistic regression was used to analyze the data.

## Results

There were 378 victims killed by far-Right extremists between 1990 and 2007; 140 were killed during ideologically motivated homicide incidents[59] and 238 were killed during non-ideologically motivated homicide incidents. Table 3 reports the results of the bivariate relationships. Both theoretical variables related to $H_1$ were statistically significant or approaching significance using the chi-square statistical test of association. Non-ideologically motivated victims were arrested or convicted of a criminal offense more often than ideologically motivated victims (26.9% versus 19.3%, respectively). Similarly, 14.3% of non-ideologically motivated victims were also extremists themselves, compared to only 1.4% of ideological victims.

Four of the five variables (i.e., age, race, sex, strangers) used to operationalize $H_2$ were significant at the bivariate level. The distribution of victim precipitation by

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**Table 3.** Bivariate relationships between victimization type and independent variables

| Independent variables | | Far-Right victims (378) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Ideological ($n = 140$) | Non-ideological ($n = 238$) | |
| $H_1$ | Criminal history | 19.3% | 26.9% | + |
| | Extremist | 1.4% | 14.3% | *** |
| $H_2$ | Married | 37.1% | 31.1% | |
| | Age 15–24 | 19.3% | 29.4% | * |
| | Minority | 51.4% | 19.7% | *** |
| | Male | 86.4% | 72.7% | ** |
| | Victim–offender strangers | 75.0% | 29.0% | *** |
| $H_3$ | Victim precipitation | 7.1% | 4.6% | |
| $H_4$ | Risky location | 11.4% | 19.7% | * |
| | Victimized at home | 12.1% | 19.3% | + |
| | Victimized at work | 28.6% | 28.6% | |
| | Victimized outside | 63.6% | 34.0% | *** |
| | Others around | 53.6% | 57.1% | * |
| | Multiple victims | 43.6% | 43.7% | |
| | Weekend | 55.7% | 34.5% | *** |
| Control | Season | | | ** |
| | Winter | 19.3% | 10.9% | |
| | Spring | 24.3% | 42.0% | |
| | Summer | 31.4% | 24.4% | |
| | Fall | 25.0% | 22.7% | |
| | Region | | | + |
| | Northeast | 15.7% | 7.6% | |
| | Midwest | 11.4% | 13.9% | |
| | South | 34.3% | 33.6% | |
| | West | 38.6% | 45.0% | |
| | Years | | | *** |
| | 1990–1994 | 30.0% | 16.4% | |
| | 1995–1999 | 37.1% | 28.2% | |
| | 2000–2004 | 22.9% | 24.8% | |
| | 2005–2007 | 10.0% | 30.7% | |
| | Offender White Supremacist | 77.9% | 92.9% | *** |

$+p < .1$, $^{*}p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{***}p < .001$.

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victimization type, the sole variable used to operationalize $H_3$, was not significant at the bivariate level. Turning to the variables related to $H_4$, the location of the victim's murder was significant. Meanwhile, although not a large difference, there was a significant association between whether others were around and the type of victimization. Examining temporal distribution, 55.7% of ideologically motivated victims were killed on the weekend compared to only 34.5%

of non-ideologically motivated victims who were killed on the weekend. Finally, for variables used to operationalize $H_4$, there was no significant association between type of victimization and victim precipitation, whether the victim was killed at work or school, or whether others were killed or injured during the victimization event. Finally, all four control variables (i.e., seasonal differences; region; temporal; whether the perpetrator was a White Supremacist) were significant at the bivariate level.

The binary logistic regression model was significant (Chi-sq = 201.9, $df = 25$, $p < .001$) and correctly classified 83.1% of the cases, an improvement of 20.1% over the model with no predictor variables.[60] The results of this analysis are presented in Table 4. Out of the two variables utilized to operationalize $H_1$, only evidence of being an extremist was significant. On average, the odds of being an extremist were 91.1% lower for ideologically motivated victims compared to non-ideologically

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**Table 4.** Binary logistic regression of ideological victimization ($N = 378$)

| Independent variables | | Exp(B) | S.E. | Sig. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| $H_1$ | Criminal history | 0.970 | (.387) | |
| | Extremist | 0.089 | (.872) | ** |
| $H_2$ | Ever married | 0.844 | (.349) | |
| | Age 15–24 | 1.027 | (.400) | |
| | Minority | 5.546 | (.336) | *** |
| | Male | 3.672 | (.425) | ** |
| | Victim–offender strangers | 4.410 | (.346) | *** |
| $H_3$ | Victim precipitation | 1.196 | (.655) | |
| $H_4$ | Risky location | 0.837 | (.488) | |
| | Victimized at home | 1.458 | (.485) | |
| | Victimized at work | 0.345 | (.405) | ** |
| | Victimized outside | 2.601 | (.345) | ** |
| | Others around | 0.738 | (.317) | |
| | Multiple victims | 1.370 | (.331) | |
| | Weekend | 3.763 | (.321) | *** |
| Control | Season (winter) | | | |
| | Spring | 0.473 | (.465) | |
| | Summer | 1.062 | (.487) | |
| | Fall | 0.837 | (.489) | |
| | | Region (west) | | |
| | Northeast | 1.618 | (.486) | |
| | Midwest | 0.668 | (.490) | |
| | South | 0.855 | (.362) | |
| | | Years (2005–2007) | | |
| | 1990–1994 | 6.633 | (.498) | ** |
| | 1995–1999 | 6.014 | (.480) | *** |
| | 2000–2004 | 3.336 | (.485) | * |
| | Offender White Supremacist | 0.170 | (.460) | *** |

$+p < .1$, $^{*}p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{***}p < .001$.
Chi-sq = 201.9***

motivated victims. Criminal history was not able to significantly predict whether a victim was killed during an ideologically motivated homicide incident or a non-ideologically motivated homicide incident.

For $H_2$ only three of the five independent variables were significant—minority status, sex, and whether the victim did not know the offender. Ideologically motivated victims were 4.5 times more likely to be minorities and 2.7 times more likely to be male compared to non-ideologically motivated victims. Compared to non-ideologically motivated victims, ideologically motivated victims were 3.4 times more likely to be killed by someone they did not know. Variables that measured whether the victim had a prior criminal history, was ever married, or was between the ages of 15 and 24 were not significant in the multivariate model. Victim precipitation, the only variable used to operationalize $H_3$, was not significant.

For the variables measuring $H_4$, whether the victim was killed at work, was killed outside, was killed by a stranger, or was killed on the weekend were significant when controlling for the other variables in the model. The odds of an ideologically motivated victim being killed at work were 65.5% less compared to non-ideologically motivated victims. Also, ideologically motivated victims were 1.6 times more likely to be killed outside than non-ideologically motivated victims. Finally, ideologically motivated victims were 2.8 times more likely to be killed on a Friday through Sunday than non-ideologically motivated victims. Other $H_4$ variables, such as victim precipitation, risky location, victimization at home, whether others were around, and whether the incident included multiple victims were not significant.

The only control variables that could significantly predict the type of victimization were the years in which the victimization occurred and the type of far-Right extremist who committed the act. When compared to the years 2005 through 2007, ideologically motivated victims were 5.6 times more likely to be killed between 1990 and 1994 compared to non-ideologically motivated victims, 5 times more likely to be killed between 1995 and 1999, and 3.3 times more likely to be killed between 2000 and 2004. Also, compared to non-ideologically motivated victims, the odds of an ideologically motivated victim being killed by a White Supremacist were 83% lower.

## Discussion

This article examined whether hypotheses drawn from RAT and LST could explain variation between ideologically motivated and non-ideologically motivated homicide victimizations committed by far-Right extremists. Our findings provide support for these frameworks. We found partial support for three of the four hypotheses. Five predictors were supported and a measure representing one predictor was significant, but in the opposite direction predicted by the theories. Two control variables were significant in the multivariate model.

As $H_1$ predicted, the victims of non-ideologically motivated homicides committed by far-Rightists were more likely than the victims of ideologically motivated homicides to be far-Right extremists. Specific to $H_2$, non-ideological victims were more likely to be White male, and know their offender. These results bolster a core RAT claim that victims and perpetrators overlap on key attributes, and know and associate with one another. Above we outlined why the victims of ideologically motivated homicides were rarely likely to know their attackers. The take-away though is that our findings are consistent with RAT and LST claims that opportunities, and

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proximity, play a key part in understanding non-ideological homicides committed by far-Rightists. We also argued that the victims of non-ideologically motivated homicides were more likely to be female because the violent patriarchal culture of the far-Right movement could translate into domestic violence attacks against female victims. Similarly, many groups (e.g., police officers, homeless, gays) targeted by the far-Right for ideological reasons are more likely to be men.

We extended this line of reasoning when looking at the results for $H_4$. Ideological victims were more likely to be murdered outside as part of their routine activities (e.g., police patrolling on the job, homeless people), while the victims of non-ideologically motivated homicides (which included domestic violence victims) would be attacked inside and in a home. These claims were fully supported in the multivariate analysis and again bolster the RAT and LST approaches.

Several predictors for $H_1$, $H_2$, and $H_4$ were significant at the bivariate level, but not in the multivariate analysis. We found, for example, that the victims of non-ideological offenders, as predicted, mirrored the regular homicide literature and were more likely to be younger, have a criminal record, and be victimized at a risky location, but only had a significant relationship with victimization type at the bivariate level. These findings converge with RAT and LST claims. Although these variables become insignificant in the multivariate model, it is possible that the criminal history finding is an artifact of our data, since we have a small N and our open-source data may not have 100% coverage in all counties. It is possible that broader coverage and a larger N would show a significant relationship. We also speculate that risky place becomes insignificant in the full model because it is weakened by the other location variables of home and work, etc.

For age, we chose a measure that identified victims who were killed during the prime offending and victimization ages of 15 to 24, expecting more non-ideologically motivated victims to fall into this category. Prior research had shown that both far-Right ideologically motivated victims and offenders are older than other offenders.[61] Although we found this at the bivariate level, the relationship disappeared when controlling for other variables. It is possible that situational characteristics, such as whether the individual was victimized at work/school or on the weekend, accounted for the variation seen at the bivariate level.

Based upon RAT and LST, we hypothesized that non-ideologically motivated homicides are more likely to occur on weekends because that is when these victims are most likely to engage in risky activities that place them in dangerous locations with more potential offenders and fewer guardians present. Our multivariate model demonstrated, however, that it was *ideologically* motivated homicide victims who were more likely to be attacked on the weekend. This unexpected finding deserves some interpretation. Freilich and Chermak examined case studies involving far-Right killings of police officers and found that some of these situations could be categorized as presented opportunities.[62] This refers to situations where far-Rightists come in contact with their enemies during an unplanned encounter. Some far-Rightists take advantage of this opportunity to commit their fatal ideologically motivated attack. This sequence could apply to anti-minority killings in addition to the anti-police killings discussed.[63] We wonder if far-Right ideologically motivated perpetrators also engage in risky activities (drinking to excess and fighting) during the weekend that bring them to the attention of the police. It is possible that young far-Rightists in their weekend activities visit locations (such as bars, or certain parts of town) that contain young minorities. It could be that young

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far-Rightists begin a weekend night not planning to attack anyone. But, their routine activities place them in situations where they become less inhibited and more likely to encounter their ideological enemies (minorities, gays, lesbians, homeless individuals, and the police), and that some then take advantage of this opportunity to launch their fatal ideologically motivated attacks. Further, a number of the non-ideologically motivated far-Right homicides examined here were school shootings (e.g., Columbine) or workplace attacks. These victimizations were, obviously, more likely to occur on a weekday as opposed to the weekend.

As noted, several expected predictors were not significant. The null effect of the marriage finding is puzzling in that non-ideologically motivated homicide victims did not mirror the general literature and were not less likely to be married. We wonder though if the reasoning just discussed may apply here too. As discussed, the largest category of far-Right ideologically motivated homicide victims were killed for anti-minority bias reasons. It is possible that many of these victims were young, unmarried, and came in contact with the far-Right offenders in risky places like bars on weekends where young unmarried individuals congregate. Further, the LGBTQ and homeless victims of the ideologically motivated attacks were also less likely to be married. We also noted above that some of the non-ideologically motivated homicides included domestic violence victims who were married. Thus, both the ideologically and non-ideologically motivated victims exhibited the same likelihood of being married or unmarried.

The three variables measuring victim provocation, multiple victims, and whether others were around also did not differ between the two victim categories in our analyses. Although theoretically unexpected, it is possible that measurement issues account for these null findings. Our provocation variable used a more stringent behavioral definition. Perhaps if we had also included verbal provocation the variable may have become significant. Similarly, our measures of both multiple victims and if others were around were dichotomous and these may have been too general. It could be that if these variables had been coded in more detail they may have produced different findings. For example, the exact number of offenders, victims, and witnesses at the scene would better measure variation across victimization type for RAT's constructs of motivated offenders, suitable targets, and capable guardians. In this circumstance, we expect that the presence of more offenders and targets, and fewer guardians, increases the likelihood of non-ideologically motivated homicide victimization.

Two of the control variables were significant in the multivariate model. Compared to others, White Supremacists were more likely to commit non-ideologically motivated homicides. This makes sense because skinheads are more akin to traditional offenders who are young men.[64] These individuals will be as likely to engage in homicides related to thrill seeking, revenge, and gang violence that are not ideologically motivated, as they are to commit ideologically motivated strikes. We also found that the odds of ideologically motivated homicide victimizations occurring declined, especially after the new millennium and 9/11. Our analysis ended in 2007 and thus we are unable to investigate whether the election of President Obama had an influence on the odds of far-Right ideologically motivated homicides—an issue worthy of future research. Finally, the other two control variables, season and region, were insignificant in the multivariate model. This tells us that the seasanol and spatial relationship between victimization types has no significant explanatory ability once the theoretical variables are introduced into the model.

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## Conclusion

This study provided support for the ability of RAT and LST to account for variation in homicide victimizations committed by far-Right extremists. There remains much to investigate in terms of extending the individual-level victimization frameworks we tested here. Future studies could examine additional measures that tap into other conceptual constructs of RAT and LST such as victims' education level and employment status and if their use of alcohol and drugs impacted their victimization. The time (e.g., morning, afternoon, evening) the victimization occurred could also be studied. RAT and LST have commonly studied these four variables in other contexts.

It is also important to use other dependent variables in future empirical tests of criminology perspectives. The ECDB provided one innovative measure of comparing victims of ideologically motivated and non-ideologically motivated homicides. Other strategies are to compare the victims of extremists to each other such as the victims of far-Right extremists to the victims of Al Qaeda and related movements and far-Left extremists. Or to compare the victims of ideologically motivated attacks to non-victims, such as a sample of the general population, who have not been victimized. An additional possibility is to compare the victims of extremist ideologically motivated homicides to the victims of non-extremist homicides committed by ''regular'' non-extremist perpetrators, by perhaps using a sample generated from the SHR. As noted above though, this is limited by the SHR's range of variables.

A possible solution to the problem of the SHR's limited number of variables could be for criminologists to borrow from the terrorism literature. Many have noted the benefits (such as rigorous methods and alternative theories) that criminology could bring to the study of terrorism.[65] But, the quantitative study of terrorism could also help advance the criminology field. The ECDB, like all unclassified quantitative terrorism databases, was built using open-sources. While media accounts are one open-source type, there are many others. As our data and methods section noted, the ECDB has innovatively exploited specialized search web-engines, court documents, official and other sources in addition to media accounts to fill in the values of our variables. Almost all criminology textbooks contain a section on measuring crime that states that the three main sources of counting and studying crime are official sources like the police, victimization surveys, or self-reported offender surveys. Perhaps the field of terrorism could help expand the use of open-sources in criminology. Criminologists studying homicide could use open-sources to expand the types of homicides they study (e.g., terrorism) and increase the number of variables they examine. Importantly, open-sources could be looked upon as an additional source to use to triangulate the findings produced from the other more traditional criminological sources.

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20. Wesley G. Jennings, Alex R. Piquero, and Jennifer Reingle, "On the Overlap Between Victimization and Offending: A Review of the Literature," *Aggression and Violent Behavior* 17 (2012): 16–26; Lauritsen, "Advances and Challenges in Empirical Studies" (see note 10 above); Janet L. Lauritsen and John H. Laub, "Understanding the Link Between Victimization and Offending: New Reflections on an Old Idea," *Crime Prevention Studies* 22 (2007): 55–76; Janet L. Lauritsen, Robert J. Sampson, and John H. Laub, "The Link Between Offending and Victimization Among Adolescents," *Criminology* 29 (1991): 265–292; Sobol, "Behavioral Characteristics and Level of Involvement for Victims of Homicide" (see note 17 above).

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22. See e.g., Randy Blazak, "White Boys to Terrorist Men," *American Behavioral Scientist* 44 (2001): 982–1000; Mark S. Hamm, *American Skinheads: The Criminology and Control of Hate Crime* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993).

23. Raphael S. Ezekiel, *Inside the Racist Mind: Portraits of American Neo-Nazis and Klansmen* (New York: Penguin, 1995).

24. See e.g., Gottfredson, "On the Etiology of Criminalization" (note 11 above), 723; Lauritsen et al., "The Link Between Offending and Victimization Among Adolescents" (note 20 above); Meier and Miethe, "Understanding Theories of Crime Victimization" (note 11 above); Miethe et al., "Social Differentiation in Criminal Victimization" (note 12 above).

25. See e.g., Hamm, *American Skinheads* (note 22 above); Smith, *Terrorism in America* (note 9 above); Jeffrey A. Gruenewald, Steven M. Chermak, and Joshua D. Freilich, "Distinguishing 'Loner' Attacks from Other Domestic Extremist Violence: A Comparison of Far-Right Homicide Incident and Offender Characteristics," *Criminology and Public Policy* 12 (2013): 1–27.

26. Freilich et al., "Introducing the United States Extremist Crime Database (ECDB)" (see note 3 above); Parkin et al., "Ideological Victimization" (see note 2 above).

27. Meier and Miethe, "Understanding Theories of Crime Victimization" (see note 11 above).

28. Parkin et al., "Ideological Victimization" (see note 2 above).

29. Ezekiel, *Inside the Racist Mind* (see note 23 above); James W. Gibson, *Warrior Dreams: Paramilitary Culture in Post-Vietnam America* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994).

30. Steven Messner and Kenneth Tardiff, "The Social Ecology of Urban Homicide: An Application of the 'Routine Activities' Approach," *Criminology* 23 (1985): 241–267; see also Tom Caywood, "Routine Activities and Urban Homicides: A Tale of Two Cities," *Homicide Studies* 2 (1998): 64–82.

31. Parkin et al., "Ideological Victimization" (see note 2 above).

32. Meier and Miethe, "Understanding Theories of Crime Victimization" (see note 11 above), 482.

33. Caywood, "Routine Activities and Urban Homicides" (see note 30 above); Gottfredson, "On the Etiology of Criminalization" (see note 11 above).

34. Lauritsen, "Advances and Challenges in Empirical Studies" (see note 10 above).

35. Gottfredson, "On the Etiology of Criminalization" (see note 11 above); Meier and Miethe, "Understanding Theories of Crime Victimization" (see note 11 above); Kenneth Polk, "A Reexamination of the Concept of Victim-Precipitated Homicide," *Homicide Studies* 1 (1997): 141–168; Sobol, "Behavioral Characteristics and Level of Involvement for Victims of Homicide" (see note 17 above); Martin Wolfgang, "Victim Precipitated Criminal Homicide," *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science* 48 (1957): 1–11.

36. Meier and Miethe, "Understanding Theories of Crime Victimization" (see note 11 above); Roncek and Maier, "Bars, Blocks and Crime Revisited" (see note 17 above); Lawrence W. Sherman, Patrick R. Gartin, and Michael E. Buerger, "Hot Spots of Predatory Crime: Routine Activities and the Criminology of Place," *Criminology* 27 (1989): 27–55; David E. Weisburd, Elizabeth Groff, and Sue-Ming Yang, *The Criminology of Place: Street Segments and Our Understanding of the Crime Problem* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

37. James P. Lynch, "Routine Activity and Victimization at Work," *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* 3 (1987): 283–300.

38. Ibid.

39. Caywood, "Routine Activities and Urban Homicides" (see note 30 above).

40. Meier and Miethe, "Understanding Theories of Crime Victimization" (see note 11 above), 481.

41. Caywood, "Routine Activities and Urban Homicides" (see note 30 above); M. Wolfgang, *Patterns in Criminal Homicide* (New York: John Wiley, 1958); A. Kposowa and D. Breault, "Temporal Factors and Homicide in the United States," *Journal of Interpersonal Violence* 13 (1998): 590–604; Messner and Tardiff, "The Social Ecology of Urban Homicide" (see note 30 above).

42. Freilich et al., "Introducing the United States Extremist Crime Database (ECDB)" (see note 3 above).

43. In addition to the far-Right homicides studied here, the ECDB also tracks financial crimes committed by Right-wing extremists, as well as violent and financial crimes committed by jihadi and environmental rights extremists (Steven M. Chermak, Joshua D. Freilich, William S. Parkin, and James P. Lynch, "American Terrorism and Extremist Crime Data Sources and Selectivity Bias: An Investigation Focusing on Homicide Events Committed by Far-Right Extremists," *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* 28 (2012): 191–218).

44. The ECDB defines far-Right extremists as individuals or groups that subscribe to aspects of the following ideals: they are fiercely nationalistic (as opposed to universal and international in orientation), anti-global, suspicious of centralized federal authority, reverent of individual liberty (especially their right to own guns, be free of taxes), believe in conspiracy theories that involve a grave threat to national sovereignty and/or personal liberty and a belief that one's personal and/or national "way of life" is under attack and is either already lost or that the threat is imminent (sometimes such beliefs are amorphous and vague, but for some the threat is from a specific ethnic, racial, or religious group), and a belief in the need to be prepared for an attack either by participating in paramilitary preparations and training and survivalism (Joshua D. Freilich, Steven M. Chermak, and David Caspi, "Critical Events in the Life Trajectories of Domestic Extremist White Supremacist Groups: A Case Study Analysis of Four Violent Organizations," *Criminology and Public Policy* 8 (2009): 497–530, 499).

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45. Freilich et al., "Introducing the United States Extremist Crime Database (ECDB)" (see note 3 above).

46. Chermak et al., "American Terrorism and Extremist Crime Data Sources and Selectivity Bias" (see note 43 above).

47. Chermak et al., "The Organizational Dynamics of Far-Right Hate Groups in the United States" (see note 9 above); Freilich et al., "Critical Events in the Life Trajectories of Domestic Extremist White Supremacist Groups" (see note 44 above).

48. Jeffrey Gruenewald and William A. Pridemore, "A Comparison of Ideologically-Motivated Homicides from the New Extremist Crime Database and Homicides from the Supplementary Homicides Reports Using Multiple Imputation by Chained Equations to Hand Missing Values," *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* 28 (2012): 141–162.

49. Joshua D. Freilich and Steven M. Chermak, "Preventing Deadly Encounters Between Law Enforcement and American Far-Rightists," *Crime Prevention Studies* 25 (2009): 141–172; Chermak et al., "The Organizational Dynamics of Far-Right Hate Groups in the United States" (see note 9 above).

50. Gruenewald et al., "Distinguishing 'Loner' Attacks from Other Domestic Extremist Violence" (see note 25 above).

51. Joshua D. Freilich, Amy Adamczyk, Steven M. Chermak, Katherine Boyd, and William S. Parkin, "Investigating the Applicability of Macro-level Criminology Theory to Terrorism: A County-Level Analysis," *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* (in press).

52. For an in-depth discussion on the ECDB, see Freilich et al., "Introducing the United States Extremist Crime Database (ECDB)" (note 3 above).

53. Parkin et al., "Ideological Victimization" (see note 2 above).

54. Please see Jeffrey A. Gruenewald, "A Comparative Examination of Homicides Perpetrated by Far-Right Extremists," *Homicide Studies* 15 (2011): 177–203, and Gruenewald and Pridemore, "A Comparison of Ideologically-Motivated Homicides" (note 48 above) for a fuller discussion on this issue.

55. In addition to victim race and ethnicity, homicide researchers have also looked at whether a victimization event was inter- or intra-racial. Since far-Right offender populations are very homogenous, and almost all offenders are White non-Hispanics, victim race/ethnicity and whether the incident was interracial are highly correlated variables and therefore only one is included in the model.

56. Students who were killed at school were coded as at work.

57. Caywood, "Routine Activities and Urban Homicides" (see note 30 above); Ellen G. Cohn, "Weather and Crime," *British Journal of Criminology* 30 (1990): 51–64; Kposowa and Breault, "Temporal Factors and Homicide in the United States" (see note 41 above).

58. Joshua D. Freilich, Nelson A. Pichardo Almanzar, and Craig J. Rivera, "How Social Movement Organizations Explicitly and Implicitly Promote Deviant Behavior: The Case of the Militia Movement," *Justice Quarterly* 16 (1999): 655–683.

59. This number does not include the 168 victims killed during the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City in 1995. The number of victims murdered in this terrorist attack is an outlier for far-Right ideological homicide incidents and including them in the analysis would have skewed the results.

60. Multicollinearity does not appear to be an issue. As suggested by Scott Menard, *Logistic Regression: From Introductory to Advanced Concepts and Applications* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2010), the model was run in SPSS as a linear regression and the collinearity diagnostics were requested. The tolerance values ranged between .395 and .913 and the variance inflation factor values ranged between 1.096 and 2.533.

61. Parkin et al., "Ideological Victimization" (see note 2 above); Gruenewald, "A Comparative Examination of Homicides Perpetrated by Far-Right Extremists" (see note 54 above); Gruenewald and Pridemore, "A Comparison of Ideologically-Motivated Homicides" (note 48 above).

62. Freilich and Chermak, "Preventing Deadly Encounters Between Law Enforcement and American Far-Rightists" (see note 49 above).

63. Ibid.

64. Blazak, "White Boys to Terrorist Men" (see note 22 above); Ezekiel, *Inside the Racist Mind* (see note 23 above); Hamm, *American Skinheads* (see note 22 above).

65. Gary LaFree and Joshua D. Freilich, "Editor's Introduction: Quantitative Approaches to the Study of Terrorism (Special Issue)," *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* 28 (2012): 1–5.

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